USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Issue No. 1011, 29 June 2012
Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: Obama Fears Pakistan Collapse Will Spark Nuclear Scramble: Book

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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Xinhua News – China

Iran's Nuclear Program "Transparent": Spokesman

June 27, 2012

TEHRAN, June 27 (Xinhua) -- Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said Wednesday that Iran's nuclear program is " transparent," the semi-official Mehr news agency reported.

"The nuclear policy of the Islamic republic of Iran and the related negotiations are being pursued transparently and seriously with the aim of defending our country's nuclear rights," said Mehmanparast responding to recent remarks of Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal about Iran's nuclear program.

According to the report, Saudi Arabian foreign minister, during a speech at a joint ministerial meeting between the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Union in Luxemburg on Monday, said that negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program is a " waste of time" and it should be pushed forward towards time-limited talks.

The latest round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 (United States, Britain, China, France, Russia plus Germany) ended without an agreement in Moscow last week, but all parties agreed to meet again in Istanbul in July at the expert level.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-06/27/c_131679990.htm

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Press TV – Iran

US, Israel Main Violators of Chemical Weapons Convention: Vahidi

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Iran’s Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi says the US and the Israeli regime violate the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), urging the complete annihilation of such weapons in the world.

“As the main possessor of chemical weapons, the United States of America, which is itself a member state of the Chemical Weapons Convention, has blatantly violated the CWC by not implementing it,” Vahidi said in a message on the occasion of national day of fighting against chemical weapons on Wednesday.

Undoubtedly, the chemical weapon arsenals of countries which stockpile such weapons are a threat to international peace and security and increase fears about the use or threats to use chemical weapons in the world, ISNA quoted him as saying.

The Israeli regime raises concern about the expansion of chemical weapons by its refusal to permit international organizations to inspect its chemical facilities, he pointed out.

Vahidi stated that the Islamic Republic is the biggest victim of chemical weapons, a gift to former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's regime by the Western powers.

During the Iraq-Iran war, the US supplied Saddam with chemical weapons. The former Iraqi dictator used 2,500 tons of chemical weapons against five Iranian border provinces.

Saddam was never tried for war crimes or use of chemical weapons against Iranians. According to experts, chemical weapons can show their full effect almost 25 years later.

Vahidi said Iran seriously calls on the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to make efforts in order to achieve the CWC’s final objectives, including the elimination of all chemical weapons in the world.

The Iranian minister also urged the United Nations to take steps towards the establishment of a world free of weapons of mass destruction including the chemical weapons.

He expressed hope that the international community would do its utmost to implement the CWC so that "we witness a world free of chemical weapons and terrorism in the near future."

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/06/27/248228/iran-raps-us-israel-breach-of-cwc/

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Al-Manar News – Lebanon

Jalili to Ashton: 'Illegitimate' Moves Will Harm Talks

Source: Agencies
29 June 2012

Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili in a letter to Katherine Ashton, EU foreign policy chief, warned that "the use of illegitimate tools" against Iran will hurt the ongoing talks between Iran and the major powers.

Referring to the logical basis of Iran's proposals to the group, he Jalili said that Iran is ready to play a role in the initiatives which pave the way for successful talks.

"Holding successful talks are possible only within the context of cooperation and winning the Iranian nation's confidence," he added.

Warning the West against use of unconstructive means in the talks, Jalili said that the party which uses illegitimate means will be responsible for any harm to the process of the talks.

The warning by Jalili comes as the EU oil embargo against Iran takes effect on Sunday.

Ashton has been leading the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) in nuclear talks with Iran.

Jalili's letter to Ashton came nine days after Iran and the major powers held talks in Moscow.

http://www1.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=60429&frid=19&seccatid=32&cid=19&fromval=1

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Japan Times – Japan
Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Law Revision Not License to Go Nuclear: Hosono

Kyodo

Nuclear disaster minister Goshi Hosono shrugged off speculation that the revision of a basic law on atomic energy may lead Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, saying Tuesday that the law clearly limits the use of nuclear power to peaceful purposes.

The three nonnuclear principles of not producing, possessing or allowing nuclear weapons on Japanese territory is a "well-established basic idea," Hosono said, responding to criticism from neighboring countries over the insertion of wording into the law stating that nuclear power should contribute to national security.

"There is no need to be concerned," Hosono said.

But he noted that the idea to add the wording came from the Liberal Democratic Party, and that the Democratic Party of Japan-led administration was not aggressively pushing for the insertion.

The revision of the Atomic Energy Basic Law is in line with a recently enacted law to authorize the creation of a new nuclear regulatory body in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

The law was crafted by the DPJ, LDP and New Komeito, though it largely reflects the thinking of the opposition partners.

An administration official explained that the wording takes into account the comprehensive role of the new body, which will be in charge of various issues related to nuclear safety, including security and safeguards to prevent proliferation.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120627a9.html

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Eurasia Review – Spain

China's Support Enables North Korea's 'Bad Behavior,' Panelists Say

Reporting by Adam Aton, Missouri School of Journalism
June 28, 2012

North Korea's attempted rocket launch in April was just the latest example of a country accustomed to reneging on international agreements, a panel of security experts told the East-West Center International Media conference in Seoul last Sunday.

The panel on Northeast Asian Security Issues touched on a wide range of topics, most of which related to North Korea, but it all boiled down to two words: distrust and misunderstanding.

"Since the first [North Korean] nuclear crisis broke out in the early 1990s, there have been repetitions of breakthroughs and breakdowns in the negotiation process," said Ambassador Lim Sungnam, head of the South Korean delegation to the stalled Six Party Talks aimed at North Korean denuclearization.

China's consistent support of North Korea enables the Pyonyang regime to flout international law, the panelists said, adding that Beijing views its support as a way to balance a region that Beijing sees as increasingly hostile.

South Korea's efforts to increase coordination with the United States and Japan as a concerted effort to counter North Korea "has created a new regional order that China perceives that as a way of returning to the old Cold War structure," said Moon Chung In, professor of political science at Yonsei University. "That's bad news."

"Beijing has shown a pattern of rewarding [North Korea's] bad behavior," said Peter Beck, South Korea country representative for the Asia Foundation. "China has shown – year in, year out – that it will steadfastly stand by North Korea, no matter what North Korea does, short of starting a war. If North Korea starts a war, I think China will watch."

Although the North Korean leadership may often seem irrational to Western eyes, Beck said, self-preservation will always be a guiding force.

"It just makes no sense sometimes, but … the North Korean regime wants to survive, and, in that sense, will behave in a rational manner," he said. "But if the regime has a death wish, if they think they're going down, all bets are off."

However, he said he doesn't see that as a likely scenario in the immediate future. "What I worry about is not that North Korea has a death wish, but that they could miscalculate," he said. "Koreans of all stripes are masters of brinksmanship, but the problem with brinksmanship is sometimes you go off the edge."

Beck appealed to the journalists in attendance not to "get North Korea wrong."

"Notice I did not say 'get North Korea right,' he added. "I don't know how to get North Korea right."

Beck said he doesn't think internal forces will topple the Kim dynasty anytime soon.

"There are many in the media who say North Korea is unstable," he said. "I don't think that's the correct word. I think what we face with North Korea is a lot of uncertainty right now, particularly regarding Kim Jung Un – who he is, what

he really thinks, who he listens to and, most importantly, what path he will be choosing in the months and years to come."

http://www.eurasiareview.com/28062012-chinas-support-enables-north-koreas-bad-behavior-panelists-say/

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Epoch Times – English Edition

Nuclear Arsenal in China Much Bigger Than Believed, Says Expert

Strategists and Arms Control Experts Disagree over Recent Report

By Matthew Robertson, Epoch Times Staff

June 28, 2012

The People's Republic of China's (PRC) notoriously opaque nuclear arsenal could be much bigger than the estimates prevalent in the United States—up to 1,800 warheads as opposed to the 300 or 400 currently thought—according to a report authored by a retired Russian colonel general.

In addition, the report says that the PRC has rail-mounted intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, and nuclear warheads on a series of ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) and cruise missiles—statements that contradict dominant understandings of China's nuclear posture.

Viktor Yesin, the former chief of the main staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces and currently professor at the Academy of Military Sciences, published his view in the military publication Military-Industrial Courier in early May.

He writes that Chinese factories that supply fissile material could have as of 2011 produced 40 tons of weapons-grade uranium and about 10 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, enough for a total of 3,600 nuclear warheads.

Yesin reasons that about half of this fissile material would not be used in warheads, but for stockpiles or other uses. Of the 1,600–1,800 warheads that were probably built, in Yesin's view, perhaps 800–900 would be operationally deployed with the rest in storage, he says.

A translation of Yesin's journal article, which runs to nine pages in English, was disseminated by Phillip Karber of the Asian Arms Control Project, which focuses on the strategic implications of the PRC's nuclear weapons buildup.

Karber's research on the PRC's network of underground tunnels used for storing nuclear weapons has previously drawn controversy, particularly from the arms control community.

In this case, views of the Russian colonel general's warhead estimates are no different, where an analysis of the recent report becomes an exercise in examining the wider debate about the PRC's nuclear posture.

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, who also blogs on arms control issues, wrote in an email commenting on Yesin's journal article that the retired general's views, which he was already familiar with, are "exaggerated" and "alarmist." Lewis also questioned the veracity and provenance of the information.

On the other side, Richard Fisher, an analyst of the PRC's military modernization and senior research fellow with the International Assessments and Strategy Center, says, "Gen. Yesin has dropped a nuclear bomb on the hubris of the American arms control community."

Yesin is a prominent commentator on strategic issues in Russia, and according to an introduction prepared by the Asian Arms Control Project "is viewed as an authoritative source closely associated with Russian government positions."

"Over the last 15 years he has been a major adviser to Putin," Karber says, adding that Yesin would have a close understanding of the PRC's nuclear arsenal in part due to extensive contacts over several decades between the two powers, and access he may have to classified sources.

Apart from the large estimates of warheads that Yesin gives—which agree with estimates Karber gave in a previous study on the PRC's underground tunnel network—Yesin's remarks about rail-mounted ICBMs equipped with nuclear warheads are significant in Karber's view.

"When you have that degree of mobility you can't track how many there are. They drive into a rail tunnel and you can't tell if there are 20 in there or only 1," Karber said. Such weapons could be used as a first strike against enemy forces or as a second strike capability against cities.

The idea of rail-mounted nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads on ballistic and cruise missiles—hundreds of them at least, according to Karber—upends the assumption that the PRC has a small nuclear force focused solely on deterrence.

The assumption that the PRC does have such a small force is shared by Jeffrey Lewis and others in the arms control community. They say that only insufficient evidence, or in some cases recycled, discredited claims or other misinformation, has been put forward to disrupt these basic assumptions.

A practical issue raised by Yesin's report is the possibility of a nuclear arms race as countries in the PRC's periphery seek to gain a semblance of nuclear parity in the face of the PRC's enormous arsenal.

Those countries, which currently see themselves under America's security umbrella, could feel that the United States was unable to protect them.

Fisher said, "By building to a level of superiority in nuclear weapons, China could cause the greatest period of nuclear proliferation in the world, as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Vietnam, and others could all rush to develop their own deterrent nuclear forces."

http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/china-news/nuclear-arsenal-in-china-much-bigger-than-believed-says-expert-258565.html

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Space Daily.com

Three Chinese Astronauts Return to Earth

By Staff Writers
Beijing, Agence France-Presse (AFP)
June 29, 2012

Three Chinese astronauts returned to Earth on Friday after achieving China's most complex and longest operations in orbit, major steps forward in the country's effort to build a space station by 2020.

The return of the trio, including the country's first female astronaut, to a landing zone in a remote and sandy area of northern China was broadcast to a national audience on state television network CCTV.

The return capsule of the Shenzhou-9 spacecraft, which lifted off on June 16, hit the ground about 10:00 am (0200 GMT), after an approach slowed by a large parachute.

Rescue workers quickly surrounded and opened the capsule, which had turned on its side and looked charred on the outside.

All three astronauts were in good physical condition, the state-run Xinhua news agency reported, as CCTV showed them being carried out of the capsule on chairs, smiling and waving to the cameras.

The crew had successfully carried out China's first manual space docking with the orbiting Tiangong-1 module, a difficult move that is essential in the process of building a space station -- which Beijing aims to do by 2020.

The manoeuvre -- completed by the Americans and Russians in the 1960s -- requires two vessels orbiting Earth at thousands of kilometres (miles) per hour to come together very gently to avoid destroying each other.

It was the main goal of the mission, China's fourth manned trip to space.

Morris Jones, an Australia-based independent expert on the Chinese space programme, said the length of the space flight -- the crew spent most of the 13 days in the Tiangong-1 -- was more significant than the manual space docking.

"This is China's longest and most complex space flight to date," Jones said.

"The most important thing about the mission is something they haven't said openly and it's the fact that this Tiangong laboratory is more than just a laboratory. It is a proper space station, albeit a very small one."

China sees its space programme as a symbol of its rising global stature, growing technical expertise, and the Communist Party's success in turning around the fortunes of the once poverty-stricken nation.

Jones and other experts agreed that the success of Shenzhou-9, which means Divine Vessel in Chinese, had helped cement China's status in these areas.

"By demonstrating that they master (these procedures), China fully enters the club of big powers in human occupation (of space)", said Isabelle Sourbes-Verger, a space expert at France's National Centre for Scientific Research.

"The political objectives for the space programme -- to be able to demonstrate indisputable technological and scientific competence -- have been reached."

The Shenzhou-9 crew was headed by Jing Haipeng, a veteran astronaut on his third space mission.

Liu Wang carried out the manual docking and the third crew member was Liu Yang, the first woman China has sent into space. The 33-year-old air force pilot has been hailed as a national heroine.

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Three_Chinese_astronauts_return_to_Earth_999.html

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Economic Times – India

Indian Navy Set to Complete Nuclear Triad: Admiral Verma

Press Trust of India (PTI)
June 25, 2012

LONDON: With the Navy poised to attain a retaliatory nuclear strike capability, India will soon have a "credible and invulnerable" deterrent nuclear triad in place, Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma said here today.

Verma said such a nuclear triad was required in view of India's 'no first-use' policy.

Setting out his analysis of India's maritime security, Admiral Verma, who is here on a three-day visit as part of a bilateral Indian Navy-Royal Navy interaction, said there was increasing awareness in India that "the destiny of our nation is entwined with our maritime destiny".

"A retaliatory strike capability that is credible and invulnerable is an imperative. The Navy is poised to complete the triad, and our maritime and nuclear doctrines would then be aligned to ensure that our nuclear insurance will come from the sea," he said while addressing a conference in London.

India is developing a retaliatory strike capability through weapon systems from land, air and sea. It is believed that it already has the capability to do so from land and air.

It will have the capability to do so with the induction of the indigenous INS Arihant nuclear submarine which is expected to be launched for sea trials in near future.

Observing that Asian nations were growing at different rates, in different ways, and different economic models, Verma expressed concern over the fact that "it may lead to rapid military growth, non-compliance with the norms of international law, and the use or threat of the use of force."

"Three of the world's four largest economies will be in Asia. Many nations widely perceived to be 'rogue', or 'failed states', also belong to the same region. The region is also recognised by many as the 'primary loci' of 'ostensible' non-state threats in the world," he said commenting on the regional scenario by the year 2025.

"Juxtaposed with these entities are three of the world's four largest Armies, and at least four declared nuclear weapon states... Certainly not a dull neighborhood!" he said.

Admiral Verma said in view of the situation, the Navy has adopted a capability-based, rather than a threat-based approach for future growth.

"We have articulated a perspective plan that lays out a roadmap for development of capability up to 2027... Our indigenous aircraft carrier project, besides the ongoing construction of destroyers and frigates, LCA (Navy) and strategic submarine programmes are a few examples," he said.

He said the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) programme is planned to be a continuing process over the next decade-plus, as part of the Navy's medium-term aim of having at least two fully operational and combat-worthy carriers available at any given time.

Verma said of the 47 ships and submarines presently on order, 44 are from Indian shipyards.

The induction programme of various vessels, he said, has been structured to continue at a pace such that over the next five years we expect to induct ships and submarines at an average rate of 5 platforms per year provided the yards deliver as per contracted timelines.

"Our air element is also being strengthened, with the induction of Mig 29K fighters, P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft as well as multirole helicopters," he said.

Meanwhile, Navy officials have said the third stealth frigate INS Sahyadri will be inducted into operational service on July 21.

This would be the third of the Shivalik Class stealth frigates being produced indigenously by the Mazagon Dockyards Limited.

Admiral Verma also said that the Indian Navy has been working with its counterparts in China, Japan and South Korea, to end the scourge of sea piracy and India's efforts had "nearly eradicated piracy in our waters".

Verma said: "It may surprise some to know that our anti-piracy operations have thus far been coordinated trilaterally with the Chinese and Japanese and very recently this initiative has included the South Korean navy. Such are the opportunities in the maritime environment".

Expressing satisfaction over the increasing allocation for the navy in the defence budget, Admiral Verma said: "Right until 1981 the Navy was constantly under 9 per cent of the Defence Budget and during times of crises, it was between 3 to 4 per cent.

"This year we crossed the 18 per cent mark, with the Defence budget at USD 36 Billion".

He added: "Though, in my view this is still a shade short - the important takeaway is that there is an increasing realisation that the destiny of our nation is entwined with our maritime destiny".

A generation ago, he said the Chief of Indian Navy would have had to contend with the challenges posed by what he called a national psyche of 'sea blindness'.

"Today, we are in gratitude of the efforts of our Veteran community that we suffer no such impediment. The Government of India is completely seized of the imperative to have a credible maritime force that is commensurate to the requirements of our national interests given the compulsions of budgetary boundaries," he said.

According to him today's global security environment was characterised by the changing nature of conflict, the predominant feature being that the challenges and their possible solutions are globalised in their character.

"Easy access to disruptive technology, sophisticated arms and distorted ideologies, have resulted in the emergence of non-state, trans-state as well as state-supported actors who are employing asymmetric means to damage political as well as social structures".

"Nanotechnology, robotics, biotechnology, nuclear proliferation and cyber warfare may change future warfare in unforeseen ways. We have had to recalibrate our responses accordingly".

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-06-25/news/32409195_1_nirmal-verma-indigenous-aircraft-carrier-nuclear-triad

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Hypersonic Brahmos Missile to be Ready by 2017

27 June 2012

The first prototype of a hypersonic cruise missile being jointly developed by Russia and India will be ready for flight testing in 2017, CEO of the Russian-Indian joint venture Brahmos Aerospace, Sivathanu Pillai, said on Wednesday.

Russia and India have recently agreed to develop hypersonic BrahMos 2 missile capable of flying at speeds of Mach 5-Mach 7.

“I think we will need about five years to develop the first fully-functional prototype [of the hypersonic missile],” Pillai said at an engineering technology forum near Moscow.

“We have already carried out a series of lab tests [of the missile] at the speed of 6.5 Mach,” he said.

Pillai said that the new missile will be made in three variants – ground-launched, airborne, and sea-launched.

The official said the new missiles will be supplied only to India and Russia, without exports to third countries.

Established in 1998, BrahMos Aerospace Ltd, a Russian-Indian joint venture currently manufactures BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles based on the Russian-designed NPO Mashinostroyenie 3M55 Yakhont (SS-N-26).

The BrahMos missile has a range of 290 km (180 miles) and can carry a conventional warhead of up to 300 kg (660 lbs). It can effectively engage targets from an altitude as low as 10 meters (30 feet) and has a top speed of Mach 2.8, which is about three times faster than the U.S.-made subsonic Tomahawk cruise missile.

Sea- and ground-launched versions have been successfully tested and put into service with the Indian Army and Navy.

The flight tests of the airborne version will be completed by the end of 2012.

The Indian Air Force is planning to arm 40 Su-30MKI Flanker-H fighters with BrahMos missiles.

ZHUKOVSKY (Moscow region), June 27 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120627/174271289.html

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People’s Daily – China

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
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Russia Acknowledges Bulava Missile in Service

(Xinhua)
June 26, 2012

MOSCOW, June 25 (Xinhua) -- The Russian Navy has already put in service the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile, the Navy Chief Commander said Monday.

"Bulava missile has been put in navy service de facto, now the paperwork is in progress," Vice Admiral Victor Chirkov told reporters.

The navy would put on duty strategic nuclear submarine of Project 955 Borei class, Yuri Dolgoruky before July 29, Chirkov said, adding that the fourth-generation 170-meter-long submarine can carry 16 Bulava ICBMs with the range of 8,000 km.

As Russia's most advanced three-stage solid fuel missile, Bulava could carry up to 10 hypersonic individually guided maneuverable warheads.

Russian forces had tested the Bulava missile 18 times prior to the decision to put it on duty. Seven out of these test failed.

http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/7856136.html

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Voice of Russia – Russia

New Voronezh Radars: Reliable Early Warning Anti-Missile Systems

By Oleg Nekhai
June 26, 2012

A network of new-generation Voronezh-class anti-missile radars will enter combat duty in Russia ahead of the approved schedule, officials said on Tuesday.

The deployment of the Voronezh radars will help provide permanent monitoring of Russia's airspace against a potential ballistic missile attack.

Moscow-based defense expert Viktor Baranets points to unique technical characteristics of the new Voronezh radars which he says are very easy to install.

"The process can be likened to the Lego game, Baranets says, adding that the Voronezh radar requires a smaller crew to operate it as compared to the Gabala radar that Azerbaijan currently leases to Russia. Another important aspect is the fact that mass production of the Voronezh radars is already in place, Baranets says, specifically touting the range of the Voronezh radar which currently stands at 6,000 kilometers and which may be increased in the future. This means that Russia's southern areas will be reliably protected against a possible missile attack."

A new-generation Voronezh radar will soon be stationed in Russia's Irkutsk Region to keep a watchful eye on airspace between the US' western coast and India. Earlier, two Voronezh radars were deployed near St. Petersburg and in Russia's Kaliningrad Region to scan the country's northern, nort-western and western areas. The Armavir radar, which will be put on combat duty by the year-end, will allow monitoring the area from France and Spain in the west, to Algeria in the southwest, Sudan in the south, and Iran, Afghanistan and parts of India and Pakistan in the southeast. At the same time, more efforts are needed to try to replace previous generation radar station with the sophisticated ones, Baranets says.

"The focus should be placed on eastern areas, where North Korea has repeatedly conducted missile tests, something that Baranets says may damage Russia's national interests. We should also concentrate on north-eastern areas which have yet to be protected against potential missile attacks," he concludes.

Vladimir Yevseyev of the Moscow-based Center of Public and Political Studies, for his part, underscores the necessity of expanding Russia's military clout in the Far East.

"The deployment of the Voronezh radar in the Primorye and Kamchatka Regions, Yevseyev says, would be of great importance, something that would enable Russia to grapple with potential ballistic missile attacks from North Korea and Japan."

Most experts agree that it's necessary to double the existing number of early warning radars currently on combat duty in Russia.

http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_06_26/79378655/

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

New Bomber Outline Takes Shape – Russian AF Commander

27 June 2012

The outline for a design of the Russian Air Force's future strategic bomber, known as PAK-DA, has been worked out, Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Viktor Bondarev said on Wednesday.

"The outline of this aircraft is already formed, and the technical and tactical characteristics are being set out," Bondarev told a news conference at RIA Novosti dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Russian Air Force.

"I think we have the resources and funding to make the plane on time, so it is ready when we need it as a replacement or addition to our Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers," he added.

The AF commander did not specify the number of new bombers expected to enter service with the Air Force after 2020.

Bondarev also denied any knowledge about the ongoing conflict between Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who has responsibility for military-industrial affairs, and the Armed Force's General Staff over the need for a new "traditional" strategic bomber.

Rogozin said on his blog last week that it would be undesirable for Russia to "go down the American route," and produce a bomber like the Northrop B-2, and repeated his earlier calls for a hypersonic air vehicle system instead of a traditional long-range bomber.

In earlier comments, Rogozin had appeared to dismiss the need for PAK-DA, saying long-range bombers would fall victim to air defense systems long before reaching their targets.

Rogozin's comments came just days after President Vladimir Putin called on Russian industry to develop PAK-DA.

MOSCOW, June 27 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120627/174266747.html

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Global Security Newswire

Russia Shortens Timetable for S-500 Deployment

June 28, 2012

Russia's new S-500 air-defense weapon could start being placed into operation as soon as next year, RIA Novosti reported on Wednesday (see *GSN*, Feb. 8).

The developmental S-500 technology is designed to eliminate up to 10 targets at ranges as great as 370 miles. The cutting-edge technology is intended to form the backbone of Russia's future air and missile defense framework.

"I think that as soon as next year we will get the first of these (S-500) systems in service," air force chief Maj. Gen. Viktor Bondarev said to reporters.

In February, weapons developer Almaz-Antey suggested that program management issues and difficulties with the technology would cause development of the S-500 to continue into 2017.

While Russia waits for receipt of the advanced missile defense systems, Bondarev said the country was still well protected from air attacks through ongoing acquisitions of the long-range S-400 Triumph as well as routine air defense response exercises.

"We have improved the response time to airborne threats to three to four seconds compared to the previous nine to 10 seconds," the major general said (RIA Novosti, June 27).

http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russia-shortens-timetable-s-500-deployment/

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia's Second Borey Class Sub to Enter Service by Yearend

28 June 2012

Russia's second Borey class strategic submarine, the Alexander Nevsky, will be commissioned by the end of 2012, First Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Sukhorukov said on Thursday.

The submarine sailed for the White Sea on June 21 to join the first Borey class vessel, the Yuri Dolgoruky, in sea trials.

"If a state commission reports on August 1 that all tasks envisioned by the trials program have been fulfilled, we will immediately start preparing documents for the submarine's commissioning," Sukhorukov said.

The official added that a planned test launch of the Bulava ballistic missile from the Alexander Nevsky will be carried out after the submarine enters service with the Russian Navy.

The Russian Navy is expected to receive at least 10 new Borey class strategic nuclear submarines by 2020.

The submarines, to be armed with Bulava ballistic missiles, will constitute the core of Russia's strategic ballistic missile submarine force after 2018, and will be deployed with Russia's Northern and Pacific fleets.

ZHUKOVSKY (Moscow region), June 28 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120628/174294782.html

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International Business Times

Obama Fears Pakistan Collapse Will Spark Nuclear Scramble: Book

By Palash R. Ghosh
June 26, 2012

U.S. President Barack Obama fears that in the event that Pakistan disintegrates, it would spark a scramble for nuclear weapons, some of which could fall into the hands of Islamic militants.

According to a book by David E. Sanger, chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times, Pakistan is Obama's "biggest single national security concern." The president even told his senior aides that he had "the least power to prevent" the potential collapse of Pakistan.

Obama even received some intelligence suggesting that Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) -- an umbrella group of Islamic militants that operate in Pakistan's northwestern tribal areas near Afghanistan -- might have obtained a nuclear weapon, or perhaps a "dirty bomb."

The suspicions were never confirmed, although fears about Pakistan's growing atomic arsenal are all too real.

The book, called "Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret War and Surprising Use of American Power," also claims that nuclear officials from both countries periodically meet surreptitiously in locales like Abu Dhabi or London to discuss nuclear security and the detection and disablement of atomic weapons in Pakistan.

Pakistani officials reportedly told their U.S. counterparts that no weapons were missing from its nuclear arsenal.

However, during his appearance at a nuclear security summit in Seoul, South Korea, in March, Obama declared: "There are still too many bad actors in search of these dangerous materials and these dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places."

As for TTP, the group has been blamed by Pakistani authorities for a number of terrorist acts, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007, as well as a multitude of attacks on Pakistani state officials and soldiers.

TTP leader Hakimullah Mahsud has vowed to dispatch suicide bombers to the U.S. and Europe to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden. The attempted bombing of Times Square in New York City in May 2010 was linked to TTP.

http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/356625/20120626/obama-pakistan-nuclear-weapons-collapse-tehrik-taliban.htm

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

U.S. Missile Defense System Completes Second Test

27 June 2012

The United States successfully carried out a flight test of a new-generation ballistic missile defense interceptor on Wednesday, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said.

The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility, located on Kauai, Hawaii, intercepted a separating ballistic missile target over the Pacific Ocean by the Navy's newest missile defense interceptor missile, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB.

The USS Lake Erie detected and tracked the missile with its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar and launched the SM-3 Block IB interceptor.

"The kinetic warhead acquired the target, diverted into its path, and, using only the force of a direct impact, engaged and destroyed the threat in a hit-to-kill intercept," the MDA said.

The first successful SM-3 Block IB intercept occurred on May 9, 2012.

Aegis BMD is the sea-based midcourse component of the MDA's Ballistic Missile Defense System and is designed to intercept and destroy short to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats.

The interceptor is an essential component of an anti-missile system the United States is building in and around Europe and is to be deployed in Romania by 2015.

MOSCOW, June 27 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20120627/174275978.html

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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
MAXWELL AFB, ALABAMA

Chicago Tribune

U.S. Leaders See Fallout if Joint Missile Funds Nixed

June 27, 2012
By Andrea Shalal-Esa, Reuters

WASHINGTON, June 27 (Reuters) - Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and his top weapons buyer warned U.S. lawmakers that failure to fund the final year of development work on a joint ground-based missile defense program with Italy and Germany could have serious diplomatic and financial consequences.

Panetta urged Senator Daniel Inouye, the chairman of Senate Appropriations Committee, to support $400.9 million in a final year of funding for the Medium Extended Air and Missile Defense System (MEADS) built by Lockheed Martin Corp and its partners in Italy and Germany.

Three other committees have already blocked funding for the program, which is jointly financed by the United States, Italy and Germany, although their moves have drawn a veto threat by the White House.

MEADS was intended to replace the U.S. Army's aging Patriot air and missile defense system, and has been in development for over a decade at a combined cost of over $4 billion.

Washington announced last year that it would stop funding the program after fiscal 2013, calling it unaffordable in the current budget climate. Some lawmakers like Senator John McCain have argued spending on the program should stop immediately.

Panetta told Inouye in a letter dated June 26 that completing development of the MEADS program would allow all three countries to benefit from their collective investment, while a U.S. pullout would be "viewed by our allies as reneging on our promises."

He said it could also negatively affect the willingness of U.S. allies to join future cooperative projects, and would likely lead to a dispute with Italy and Germany.

Frank Kendall, defense undersecretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, told Senator Richard Shelby, a strong supporter of the MEADS program, in a separate letter, that U.S. contracts with Italy and Germany would have to be terminated or significantly restructured if the funding was cut off.

He said Italy and Germany would likely argue that the U.S. Defense Department should have to pay termination costs and other financial liabilities for any contract modifications.

He said the move would also prompt Germany and Italy to buy European-built alternatives to upgrade their air and missile defense systems, and could undermine U.S. efforts to argue for more defense cooperation and burden-sharing.

U.S. withdrawal from MEADS would also jeopardize other ongoing cooperative acquisition programs and purchases of defense equipment from the U.S., he said. Italy has already scaled back its planned procurement of F-35 fighter jets, also built by Lockheed.

Kendall and Panetta both argued that failure to finish funding development of the MEADS program would also make it difficult for the United States and its partners to harvest certain radar, software and electronic technologies from the joint program.

That in turn, he said, would force the Pentagon to pay for new development efforts in the future.

Panetta said congressional failure to fund MEADS would also diminish a major breakthrough reached on missile defense at the NATO summit in Chicago in May, where NATO countries said they had reached "interim capability" on ballistic missile defense as an initial step towards establishing a NATO missile defense system.

"The United States relies on allies to share the burden of peacekeeping and defense in coalition activities," Panetta said. "In this context, I believe that it is important to live up to our commitments to our allies."

Earlier this month, German and Italian officials warned U.S. lawmakers that their plans to cut off funding for the MEADS program would endanger U.S. ties with their countries.

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-27/business/sns-rt-lockheed-missilecongressl2e8hs0av-20120627_1_missile-defense-system-air-and-missile-medium-extended-air

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Washington Times

Inside the Ring: Political Delay for ICBM Test?

By Bill Gertz, *The Washington Times*
Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Defense officials say unusual delays in conducting an Air Force intercontinental ballistic missile test may have more to do with politics than technical problems.

The Air Force Global Strike Command, based at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., planned to conduct a Minuteman III flight test earlier this year but has scrapped the launch three times.

One missile was fired in April, but a second test is now delayed until after the presidential election.

Defense officials disputed the official explanation for the delays: that components used in the missile's self-destruct mechanism malfunctioned and needed to be replaced.

That claim was challenged by a missile specialist who said it was an excuse. The official said such glitches are normally remedied with redundant systems, or a relatively quick parts replacement that should not take nine months.

Further suspicions of a political decision behind the testing delay were fueled when the Strike Command recently announced the test now will take place Nov. 14 - after the presidential election - when it may well be put off again.

"The launch for GT 206 is scheduled for Nov. 14," said Strike Command spokeswoman Michele Tasista, referring to the number designator. "This is the only test window remaining for us in 2012. We expect four test launch opportunities in 2013."

According to Obama administration arms control officials, concern about Chinese or Russian reaction to the routine and necessary test-firing likely intervened to put off the test so as to avoid upsetting the Russians.

"These things can't just be fired off because [Air Force Strike Command] decides to," said one official. "They are carefully planned and controlled by treaties."

The political misgivings are the result of senior U.S. officials fearing a nuclear-armed adversary might mistake the test launch for a pre-emptive nuclear attack.

By contrast, Russia's military apparently has no similar concerns. Moscow test-fired a new ballistic missile in May that Russian officials said has new capabilities to penetrate U.S. missile defenses, a major Russian concern.

Officials at the Air Force Strike Command, which is in charge of the test, disputed the assertion of political interference but declined to answer questions about the testing delays beyond a brief statement.

"The only policy issue we are aware of pertains to range safety, and that is why we are replacing a test-unique instrumentation component on the missile," Ms. Tasista said.

The three ICBM launch postponements, first set for March 1, then April 10 and most recently May 16, were due to the same problem related to the missile's self-destruct capability, according to the command.

The missile was to be fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., home of the U.S. long-range missile defense interceptors that are part of the system that has upset Russia and China because of their capabilities to shoot down high-speed long-range missiles.

Air Force Lt. Col. Ron Watrous told Inside the Ring that the delays are the result of the technical problems with the missile destruct mechanism that were found after the successful flight test of a Minuteman III in April and led to the delays in the next test. That flight test was the only one so far this year and, unless the November test occurs, could be the last.

Asked if arms control concerns were behind the delays, Col. Watrous said: "There has been no discussion of any of that. It is simply a range safety issue."

The Strike Command statement said the "test-unique instrumentation component on the missile" being replaced is solely for test launches for safety and tracking and "does not have any role or impact on the operational reliability or effectiveness of the ICBM itself."

"The test-unique component, which is being replaced, is part of a larger flight termination system, which provides Airmen the ability to monitor and safely terminate the missile in flight," the statement said.

The tests program is designed to "to validate and verify the effectiveness, readiness and accuracy of the weapon system," the statement said, noting that "we have several other tests by which we obtain the data necessary to confirm the operational readiness of the ICBM fleet."

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/27/inside-the-ring-political-delay-for-icbm-test/

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Times of India – India

Saudi Arabia Helped India Nab 26/11 Handler Abu Jundal

By Neeraj Chauhan, Tamil News Network (TNN)
June 26, 2012

NEW DELHI: Saudi Arabia has helped India with a major breakthrough in the probe into the 26/11 attacks by facilitating the arrest of Syed Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal, one of the key plotters of the Mumbai raid.

Jundal, who directed Ajmal Kasab and other 26/11 attackers from the Lashkar control room, was picked up by the Saudi police, who put him on a New Delhi-bound flight after alerting the authorities here about their prize catch.

The Lashkar terrorist , an Indian national wanted in many terror cases who was arrested on June 21, has since made the stunning claim that LeT chief Hafiz Saeed was present in the control room when the 26/11 masterminds choreographed the Mumbai attacks. He has also said that ISI and Pakistani army officials were involved in planning 26/11 and attended the meetings.

After Kasab and David Headley, the arrest of Jundal is seen as the third major success in India's effort to unravel the 26/11 plot.

Kasab's arrest was important since his Pakistani nationality exposed Islamabad's initial stubborn denial about involvement in the strike, and put paid to the plan to pin the blame on homegrown terrorists; even Hindu radicals.

Taught 26/11 attackers Hindi

Abu Jundal's significance lies in the key role he played in preparations and during the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. Being from Beed in Maharashtra, he taught the basics of Hindi usage to the Pakistani Laskhar squad. On the fateful day, he was in the control room firing instructions to killers, and also coached the killers to wrong-foot the Indian investigators and global community by posing as members of a fictional Indian outfit: Deccan Mujahideen.

In the tapes of the conversation between the terrorists and those in the control room, one of the handlers is heard saying "Lo Jundal Bhai se baat karo", in what is seen as reflecting his familiarity with the plotters and executioners. Sources said, he was present when Lashkar commander Zaki-ur Rahman Lakvhvi trained the attackers in a 12-day training camp organized at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Jundal himself tutored the terrorists for three days on how to get by in Mumbai.

His statement to the Delhi Police about Saeed's presence in the LeT control room directly incriminates the LeT chief who has strenuously denied his complicity in the terror strikes.

Sources in the Delhi Police said Jundal, who figures in India's list of "most wanted" fugitives sheltered in Pakistan, has said that Lakhvi, Azam Cheema, Muzammil and one more handler were also in the control room.

Indian authorities expect him to provide more clarity on the participation of two serving officers of Pakistan army — Major Sameer and Major Iqbal. The 26/11 tapes have a reference to one "Major General Saheb". Indian authorities hope Jundal would help them ascertain the identity of this person and his connection with the ISI.

Jundal is a vital part of the conspiracy. Tutored by him, the attackers claimed they were motivated by Indian government's atrocities against Muslims and the plight of Kashmiri Muslims. The ploy that fitted well with Pakistan's claim that terrorism in India was an indigenous affair; although the use of typical Hindi expressions like "prashashan" for authorities and recommendations for Sachar Commission immediately led Indian investigators to smell a rat.

"He knows a lot. He claims that they prepared for years for the 26/11 attack and every person was assigned a separate task. Being a Maharashtrian, he was given the task to familiarize the killers with local dialect as well as Mumbai's topography. He instructed the gang on how to ask for directions and what to say if checked and quizzed," said a senior officer familiar with the details of his interrogation.

Jundal was produced before chief metropolitan magistrate Vinod Yadav by a Delhi Police team, led by ACP Ashok Chand and DCP Sanjeev Yadav. The Delhi Police have been given his custody for 15 days after which he may have long sessions with the police from Maharashtra and Gujarat as well as the NIA. He may also be brought face-to-face with Kasab.

Indian authorities expect Abu Jundal to provide more clarity on the participation of two Pak army officers — Major Sameer and Major Iqbal— in the 26/11 attack.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Saudi-Arabia-helped-India-nab-26/11-handler-Abu-Jundal/articleshow/14396009.cms?

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The Nation – Pakistan

Saudi Convicted of US Terror Plot

By Agence France-Presse (AFP)
June 29, 2012

CHICAGO — A Saudi national was convicted Wednesday of plotting attacks on the Texas home of former US president George W. Bush, nuclear plants, hydroelectric dams and other targets, prosecutors said.

Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, 22, was arrested last year after a chemical supplier became suspicious when he tried to order concentrated phenol, a toxic chemical that has legitimate uses but is also a powerful bomb-making tool.

The FBI found journal entries and emails in which he wrote about how he sought a scholarship to a Texas university in order to be able to "target the infidel Americans" and detailed how he would carry out Jihad.

One email he sent himself with the title "targets" contained the names and home addresses of three members of the US military who had been stationed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Another, titled "Tyrant's House," listed Bush's address in Dallas.

The FBI also found evidence that he was looking into using dolls to conceal explosives, targeting a nightclub with a backpack bomb and had emailed himself instructions on how to convert a cell phone into a remote detonator and how to booby-trap a vehicle using household items.

"This case serves as another reminder of the need for continued vigilance both at home and abroad," said Assistant Attorney General for National Security Lisa Monaco.

"As this trial demonstrated, Aldawsari purchased ingredients to construct an explosive device and was actively researching potential targets in the United States," Monaco said in a statement.

"Thanks to the efforts of many agents, analysts and prosecutors, this plot was thwarted before it could advance further."

Aldawsari faces a maximum sentence of life in prison and a $250,000 fine after being convicted of one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. His sentencing was set for October 9.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/29-Jun-2012/saudi-convicted-of-us-terror-plot

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency
OPINION/Commentary

Cyber Arms Race Could Change the World Around Us

26 June 2012
By RIA Novosti commentator Konstantin Bogdanov

The world is getting ready for a new arms race – this time in cyber weapons. What was previously considered to be the domain of semi-criminal marginal groups or a cheap way of expressing sociopathy is now attracting the interest of governments, who are considering producing weaponized software on an industrial scale.

Whereas before it was unclear what the endless “army cyber commands” and other sinecures were up to, the last two or three years have seen the appearance of very unpleasant evidence of serious work potentially capable of changing the image of the world as we know it.

We’ve seen nothing like this before

This was the initial reaction of Symantec analysts when they started looking into an incomprehensible computer worm nicknamed Stuxnet. Two major waves of spreading the worm were noted: the first version in summer 2009 and the second in spring 2010.

Developers found a rootkit (a set of malicious software programs that integrate into the system without being detected) which was a cyber-weapon masterpiece. According to experts, half a million euros might have been spent on developing this sophisticated piece of software. The worm was unique in every respect – it simultaneously used four earlier unknown Windows bugs and two genuine security certificates. At the same time Stuxnet carried out its main task (introduction, analysis of the environment and further expansion) in a very slow and unobtrusive manner.

The worm targeted industrial control systems, in particular a specific brand of Siemens industrial controllers. At the same time, the rootkit included control procedures for variable frequency drive converters of two specific brands (of Finnish and Iranian roots).

Moreover, experts said the worm was not rushing into these converters but gradually penetrated the industrial network, gathering information about its modes and fully establishing control over the computer monitoring system.

Only once it had done this did the virus begin to gently "manipulate" parameter settings. It would take them out of action for a short time in order to disrupt the operation of the equipment.

Based on the distribution of the worm, experts established a potential target of attack: software-controlled centrifuges at the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran.

In late November 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on the record that cyber attacks created "problems" in what he called a "limited" number of centrifuges. Naturally enough, this report evoked an instant response from the public and the media, crediting Stuxnet with the successful termination of Iran's enrichment efforts.

Your hard work is not your achievement but their failing

There is, however, considerable doubt that the worm attack took place (or at least that it caused any noticeable results). Experts on computer and industrial security sounded the alarm but nuclear workers remained calm.

At any rate, IAEA experts who were directly in charge of monitoring the Natanz facility bluntly rejected any allegations that any disruptions in the work of the plant took place. Nonetheless, they admitted that the worm could in theory penetrate the facility's computer network.

Their conclusions are understandable – there was no evidence of a drop in production at the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, the supposed target of the attack. The rate of breakdown of centrifuges accelerated somewhat between November 2009 and January 2010, but that could be explained by the mass replacement of worn-out or low-quality Iranian-produced equipment. No evidence of any emergency at the plant was recorded.

Moreover, it seems that the worm's developers may have outsmarted themselves. In working with frequency drive converters, they used the parameters that had been supplied by Iran through the IAEA. It is not clear whether this was a Tehran-inspired leak or whether these "brainiacs" simply used the first information that seemed authentic to them and did not bother checking it. In other words, anti-nuclear hackers were let down by the ignorance of the hardware they were planning to take over. Moreover, it is possible that the equipment at Natanz was not the intended target of the worm.

However, you could say the Iranians were lucky. The virus in the network was discovered very fast and adverse consequences were avoided. This is probably why no meaningful traces of the attack were found: the worm's impact on Iran's centrifuges was designed to be very subtle, causing increased wear and tear over a long period of time.

Smile you're on camera

In the meantime, the "anonymous well-wisher" of the Iranian nuclear program has continued working. Stuxnet was followed by two most interesting rootkits: Duqu, which was discovered in September 2011, and Flame, which was intercepted in late May 2012.

Unlike the mischievous Stuxnet, which was targeted at industrial control systems, these viruses were more conventional, though no less dangerous.

Both rootkits could be described as comprehensive tracking systems that collected information from infected computers. They intercepted passwords, tracked key presses, recorded sound from an in-built microphone, took screenshots, gathered information on processed files and analyzed network traffic. This information was then encrypted and downloaded to an external master server.

Analysts believe that the approaches to the development of Stuxnet and Duqu are so similar that they may have a common platform. In any event, both rootkits are likely to have been created by the same team.

Flame is considered to be a separate product, but some of the solutions typical for it can be traced back to the first 2009 version of Stuxnet. This suggests that at least two groups of developers, who partially relied on each other's work, might have been involved in this project.

"Olympic Games" for Iran

The intuitively obvious guess about who was behind these efforts was confirmed not long ago. In June 2012, The New York Times bluntly reported that Stuxnet and Flame were developed during the operation Olympic Games, a joint effort between two electronic intelligence agencies, the U.S. National Security Agency and Israel's Unit 8200.

According to the newspaper's sources, the operation was launched on the orders of George W. Bush. This is the estimated period for the development of Stuxnet and Flame. Having replaced Bush in the White House, Barack Obama ordered that this work be accelerated with a view to impeding Iran's nuclear program. All efforts to this end were code-named Olympic Games.

On precisely the fifth day after the publication, The Wall Street Journal carried the official reaction to it: "The FBI has opened an investigation into who disclosed information about a classified U.S. cyber attack program aimed at Iran's nuclear facilities…" No further comment is needed.

Don't play with matches at a gas station

It does not matter whether Stuxnet's "physical attack" on Iran's centrifuges was a success or if it was introduced into the facility's network but failed to do much damage.

This is a model of a cyber weapon which is aimed not so much against strictly "virtual" targets (such as private information or the proper functioning of information systems) as against the actual physical infrastructure.

Industrial control systems are widespread. They are the backbone of all automated modern production systems, including hazardous ones. Computer systems are used to run energy facilities, gas compressor stations and control traffic.

The development of an effective cyber weapon capable of putting such systems out of action could have disastrous consequences.

In this sense, we are at about the same stage as the world was between July 16 and August 6, 1945, after the United States tested its first nuclear device near Alamogordo but had not yet dropped any nuclear bombs on Japanese cities.

These new awkward cyber weapons, the development of which is sponsored by the leading powers, will be followed by others, more effective and more sophisticated. The problem is that such weapons can potentially do much more damage to advanced "critical infrastructures," of which there is a higher number in the United States and Western Europe than in Asia. Those who have launched this race for cyber weapons are throwing stones while living in glass houses.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120626/174251897.html

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Express Tribune – Pakistan

Weapons of Peace

It is ironic that Pakistan has to resort to developing weapons of peace (short-range ballistic missiles).
By Zahir Kazmi
June 27, 2012

The short-range ballistic missile Hatf-IX (Nasr) was termed a "weapon of peace" by the Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, Lt-Gen (retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, after its successful flight test. This year, Pakistan has conducted several tests of ballistic and cruise missiles that can deliver nuclear and conventional payloads at short and medium ranges.

Over the years, India had developed a doctrine to fight limited wars without crossing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. India christened this policy as the Cold Start Doctrine. New Delhi has now started distancing itself from this doctrine

and has replaced the moniker with the seemingly benign term, Proactive Defence Strategy. Some believe that India's limited war thinking has been influenced by two phenomena. One, Pakistan's 1999 attempt to retake territory in Kargil and internationalise the Kashmir issue. Two, conduct surgical operations to punish Pakistan for Mumbai-2008 type attacks, which it believes were not the deeds of non-state actors. Pakistan's short-range ballistic and cruise missiles seek to deter India from contemplating war even if it has limited territorial and political aims.

The Western experience with short-range missiles brings up two concerns. One, these missiles pose challenges in command and control. Two, there is always a possibility that the use of short-range missiles would quickly escalate into a nuclear war. In Pakistan's case, the control for these short-range weapons would presumably remain centralised and the orders to use them would emanate from the National Command Authority (NCA) that is chaired by the PM. The test of Hatf-VIII (Ra'ad) provided evidence that decision-makers at the NCA have the capability to effectively control all strategic assets with round-the-clock situational awareness in a digitised network centric environment. Indeed, short-range missiles increase the risk of nuclear war and this works as deterrent between rational adversaries.

If the reports about the successes in the flight tests of the short-range missiles were correct, Pakistan would logically follow up with simulated tests of different types of warheads these could carry. With technological prowess to build smaller warheads, Pakistan would inch towards making delivery systems for submarine platforms and multiple, manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles that could beat anti-missile defences. India is already experimenting with nuclear submarines and developing missiles for these. If Pakistan follows suit, both states would be deterred from a full-blown nuclear war.

It is ironic that Pakistan has to resort to developing weapons of peace. A Russian proverb captures the irony, *doveryai, no proveryai*, which roughly translates "trust, but verify". While Pakistan would continue its efforts to build trust, it would not blink in keeping an eye on its adversary and reciprocate in developing weapons of peace.

The writer is a master's student at the Strategic and Nuclear Studies Department of the National Defence University, Islamabad.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/399425/weapons-of-peace/

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Calcutta Telegraph – India
OPINION/Analysis
Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Threats in the Long Range

- The twists and turns of ballistic missile defence in South Asia
By Kanwal Sibal

Tensions between the United States of America and Russia over the deployment of a ballistic missile defence system by the US in eastern Europe are sharpening. Japan is deploying such a system to ward off the North Korean missile threat. With fears of increasing missile proliferation, BMD deployments could take place also in the Gulf region. What stock-taking can one do of the situation in South Asia?

India's strategic neighbourhood is extremely difficult, with two large neighbours, China and Pakistan, possessing nuclear weapons and a panoply of missiles and collaborating with each other to contain India. No other country faces such a powerful combination of adversarial direct neighbours.

India is therefore compelled to develop technologies and capacities to protect itself. But it faces considerable technological and financial constraints. Its formidable challenge is to develop capacities that are autonomous but also available in reasonable time frames.

India's political system and domestic economic and social challenges dispose it towards moderation. It seeks to develop the base of high technologies in the country, but without excessive investment of resources and determined acceleration of programmes.

India's missile development programme began in 1986 and it is only this year that it has successfully launched its 5,000-kilometre range Agni V missile. Its earlier development of Prithvi and Agni III missiles gave it the means to develop a BMD programme, which began in 1999.

India's BMD programme has a two-tiered system, with the Prithvi air defence for high altitude exo-atmospheric (50 to 80 kms) and advanced air defence for low altitude endo-atmospheric (15 to 30 kms) interception. Future plans include two new anti-ballistic missiles, AD-1 and AD-2, for intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles at a range of around 5,000 kms.

India has carried out seven BMD tests in all, six of them successful, of which two used the PAD exo-atmospheric interceptor and four the endo-atmospheric one. The first was on March 6, 2006, the seventh on February 10, 2012.

India's BMD system is being developed in two phases: in the first phase against missiles with less than 2,000 km range, like Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen missiles, with 600 km-range radars and missiles at the speed of Mach 4-5 and expected deployment by 2013.

It will be a two-tiered terminal phase interceptor system consisting of a PAD exo-atmospheric interceptor missile, an AAD endo-atmospheric interceptor and the "Swordfish" long range tracking radar developed jointly with Israel. Under phase one, the national capital region will be covered and later other cities will be protected.

The current PAD missile is intended to be replaced by a PDV missile in the PAD/AAD combination by eliminating the liquid-fuel first stage and creating a two solid-fuel stage missile capable of interception at altitudes of upto 150 kms.

Phase two will cater for missiles with a range greater than 2,000 kms, will reach Mach 6-7 speed and have the capability to manoeuvre and deploy decoys. It will require long range radars with a detection range of 1,600 kms with greater indigenous content. Several technologies, such as a space based launch detection system, have to be integrated to make this possible, and all this will take several more years to develop.

A satellite kill vehicle, using Agni III, is reportedly being developed but no test has been scheduled so far, as delicate political considerations are involved. China's ASAT test in 2007 has spurred Indian concerns because our growing space assets need protection.

While the achievements of India's Defence Research and Development Organisation are impressive, claims that we can deploy an effective BMD system against intermediate range ballistic missiles and ICBMs in the next few years invite some scepticism. Of course, India is not planning a full spectrum BMD system because of technological and financial limitations. Even the US, after spending billions, does not possess such a system and is looking for financial burden-sharing now even for developing and deploying the Standard Missile 3 that can intercept an incoming missile mid-course. The Indian effort is concentrated on the terminal phase which gives limited geographical coverage as compared to mid-course interception.

However, in terms of actual effectiveness in battlefield conditions, like other systems, the Indian system will have to contend with the enemy overwhelming the shield with a large number of warheads or mirved missiles. The Chinese have this capability.

Just as the Russians are developing new missile and reworking systems to defeat the proposed US BMD shield, the Chinese and the Pakistanis will react similarly to India's BMD system. Chinese experts claim China has never taken India as a strategic rival and that none of its weapons were designed to contain India. Similarly India says that its longer range Agni missiles are intended to deter China and not Pakistan, but this does not deter Pakistan from developing its missile capacities further to counter India. Regional diplomatic initiatives to address these problems are very difficult to work out.

The US BMD deployments are triggering Chinese responses with an impact on our region. China wants to deter the US, India wants to deter China and Pakistan, Pakistan wants to deter India. China will not limit its capabilities to assuage India's concerns so long as it perceives a threat from the US. India will continue to develop credible deterrent capabilities against China so long as the China threat exists and expands, and will not be able to respond to Pakistan's calls for a mutual strategic restraint regime that leaves China out.

Significantly, all those countries deploying terminal defence systems are integrated into the US surveillance and tracking capabilities. India and the US have signed a 10-year defence framework agreement that provides for expanding collaboration relating to missile defence. In January 2012, a senior Pentagon official stated that the US was open to collaborating with India on the missile defence shield project and would restart the dialogue with India on the subject.

For many years India and the US have been talking about missile defence issues, without tangible progress so far. India wants to retain its autonomy in this area.

In sum, India is making progress in developing a BMD system even if its effectiveness in battlefield conditions remains open to question. India has little choice in this regard as it cannot allow the strategic gap between it and China to grow irretrievably. It must remain abreast of vital strategic technologies. India has to consider developing ASAT technologies before any international regime is reached that excludes India like the non-proliferation treaty.

India is not a member of any alliance and must rely on itself for its defence. This makes it necessary for it to develop its strategic capacities sufficiently and independently. The conditions for a separate Indian subcontinental deal on such issues do not exist as China would not want to be constrained in its choices *vis-a-vis* the US by the India factor, apart from its unwillingness to deal with India on the basis of equality in nuclear matters, and India will not want to be constrained in its choices *vis-a-vis* China by the Pakistan factor.

This is a circular problem and squaring this circle will be exceedingly difficult indeed.

The author is former foreign secretary of India.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120627/jsp/opinion/story_15661900.jsp

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New York Times
OPINION/
June 27, 2012

Cargo, the Terrorists' Trojan Horse

By JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON
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MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores.

To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law.

Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is "far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile."

But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable.

An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports.

Homeland Security says it uses a "layered, risk-based approach" to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate.

Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security's contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world's largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect.

Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination.

We recognized that the scanning of 100 percent of all cargo containers in five years could be a challenging deadline to meet. That is why we included the authority to extend the deadline in cases in which Homeland Security certified that there are at least two major obstacles relating to the availability and accuracy of the technology, the logistics of its deployment and use, or impacts to trade.

Now Homeland Security is using this authority to simply exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law we wrote to close a dangerous loophole in United States security. We have urged the department over the last five years to make the law a reality, to no avail. Our nation can no longer risk such delays.

Jerrold L. Nadler, Edward J. Markey and Bennie G. Thompson are Democratic representatives from New York, Massachusetts and Mississippi, respectively.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerous-delay-on-port-security.html?_r=1

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Heritage Foundation
OPINION/The Foundry

New START: Same Baseless Arguments

By Michaela Bendikova
June 28, 2012

The New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (New START) has not advanced U.S. national interests since it entered into force. Yet, for the treaty's proponents, no amount of evidence is enough to recognize treaty's flaws.

In a recent op-ed, Terri Lodge of the American Security Project assumes that U.S. military planners would be blind without the treaty and would have to plan for the worst case scenario. In fact, the treaty requires unilateral U.S. reductions and allows build-up of Russia's strategic forces. In addition, since the treaty entered into force, Russia

launched the most extensive nuclear modernization program since the end of the Cold War. Russian President Vladimir Putin's rampant anti-Americanism and periodic threats to use nuclear weapons against U.S. NATO allies do not leave much space for optimism regarding strategic planning.

Lodge assumes that "New START verification measures enhance transparency regarding our U.S. and Russian deployed strategic systems." This is just not so. New START's verification regime is severely degraded compared to the original START's standard. Data exchanges have not provided insights into Russia's strategic build-up or locations of its strategic systems.

The treaty "does not stipulate the 'right level' of modernization funding," Lodge would have you believe. The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty, however, is contingent upon President Obama's own certification that he will provide nuclear modernization funding pursuant to the updated Section 1251 of the fiscal year (FY) 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. While the Administration pledged $7.9 billion for nuclear infrastructure modernization in FY 2013, the President's current budget request misses this mark by $300 million. This calls into the question the political and legal framework in which New START operates.

Moreover, the Russians have repeatedly used New START to limit U.S. missile defense policies, because the treaty's preamble states that U.S. missile defense capabilities must come down as the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons come down under the treaty. President Obama, for his part, indicated his willingness to accommodate Russian objections to the U.S. expanding its missile defense capabilities after he is re-elected.

As Heritage's Baker Spring observes, "What is now clear is that whatever commitments [the President] makes to the American people regarding ballistic missile defense in the coming months will be jettisoned in favor of commitments to the Russian government to curtail U.S. and allied missile defense capabilities following the election."

New START is a failure and must be seen in the context of the failure of the Obama Administration's "reset" policy with Russia and its desire to achieve a world without U.S. nuclear weapons. The "reset" policy has required too many concessions with few benefits for the U.S. and is in dire need of reassessment. Reductions in the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal should be driven by an effort to maximize the deterrent value of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, not by disarmament policy as an end in itself.

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http://www.foundry.org/2012/06/28/new-start-same-baseless-arguments/

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Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) – India
OPINION/IDSA Comment

Pakistan Navy's 'Nuclear' Aspirations

By Abhijit Singh
June 29, 2012

Recent reports from Pakistan seem to suggest the Pakistan Navy (PN) may be on the cusp of developing a naval nuclear missile capability, even as its plans for acquiring a nuclear submarine capability gradually become clearer. The first indication of this came in May 2012 when Pakistan tested the Hatf VII (*Babur*)—an indigenously developed Cruise Missile with high precision and manoeuvrability. Reports suggested that the missile was launched from a state-of-the-art multi-tube Missile Launch Vehicle (MLV), which significantly enhances the targeting and employment options of the *Babur* Weapon System in both the conventional and nuclear modes. Importantly, this is the third test of the *Babur* in the recent past, of different capacities and loads.

Then, in another significant development, on May 19, the PN inaugurated the Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). A statement from the Pakistan military's Inter Services Public Relations said that the NSFC

"will perform a pivotal role in development and employment of the Naval Strategic Force," and was "the custodian of the nation's 2nd strike capability" – presumably for use against India, in case the need ever arose. This is noteworthy because Pakistan is not known to have a sea-based second strike capability. Therefore, a public statement that the NSFC would be in-charge of such a capability is an open admission of sorts that Pakistan is in the process of developing a naval variant of a strategic nuclear missile.

For long, the Pakistan Navy has viewed the Indian Navy (IN) with suspicion. The IN's sustained growth over the past few years has, in fact, become an excuse for the PN to push for its own development and expansion of assets. In an article written for a Pakistan daily in May 2012, Tauqir Naqvi, a retired Vice Admiral of the PN, suggested that the 'hegemonic' elements of the Indian Navy's maritime strategy have been the main drivers of the resurgence of the Pakistan Navy. The article, when read closely, is a dead give-away of Pakistan's real ambitions with regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines.

Naqvi writes extensively about India's strategic vision, characterising it as a "hegemonic" impulse that has led the IN to aim for control of the seas over an area extending from the Red Sea in the West to Fiji in the Pacific Ocean. While Pakistan, he contends, is a "peace-loving" nation, India has never been serious about developing friendly relations, fixated as it has been with the "idea of projecting power". Surprisingly, he showers Indian scientists and the IN with some unexpected, even if 'motivated' praise, by mentioning the sterling efforts of the Indian scientific community and shipyard workers in operationalising a strategic maritime capability. The complimentary references are, in effect, a none-too-disguised message to Pakistan's political leadership and mandarins in the defence ministry about the ineluctable need for Pakistan to buttress its own strategic arsenal with naval nuclear missiles and a nuclear submarine, without which, the PN can forget about countering the "evil designs" of the Indian Navy.

It is, however, Naqvi's references to India's two nuclear submarines—INS *Chakra* (SSN) and INS *Arihant* (SSBN)—that dispel all doubts about the real intentions behind the avidly rendered piece. Naqvi opines that the threat that the two nuclear platforms collectively pose to the security of Pakistan, is near-existential. It is the completion of the Triad (land, air and sea based nuclear weapons), he observes, that gives India the confidence to respond with nuclear weapons, even if it is made to absorb a first nuclear strike. INS *Arihant* is that crucial second strike capability which could give India the vital edge during a conflict. The SSBN, he concludes, is an essential component of a nuclear arsenal, one that Pakistan must singularly pursue.

However, in his enthusiasm to convince Pakistan's defence establishment about the need for a SSBN, Naqvi overstates his case when he mentions the "diplomatic advantage" that may accrue to India on account of its nuclear submarine. There is hardly any modern precedent of a nuclear submarine (by itself) being an effective instrument of 'diplomatic persuasion', as he suggests. Nor does it really help in negotiating with other states possessing similar capability, as cooperation and negotiation in the strategic realm has to do with 'bottom-line' naval capacities in securing maritime interests and an overlap in strategic interests. While maritime cooperation does lead to economic benefits, it is not on account of possessing a ballistic nuclear weapon submarine capability, which is purely for the purposes of strategic deterrence.

The *Arihant* is a significant addition to the Indian Navy's arsenal but it does not introduce a strategic imbalance in the India-Pakistan context, as India, by embracing a 'No First Use' doctrine, has already renounced the strategic advantage. The Arihant's introduction does not alter this basic reality and is unlikely to tilt the strategic balance drastically. If anything, its gives India a measure of greater confidence in securing its own maritime interests, which does not necessarily translate into overwhelming dominance of the Indian Ocean or greater vulnerability of Pakistan to India's strategic weapons.

Given India's territorial expanse and the spread of its nuclear weapon sites, even if Pakistan did get a nuclear missile capable submarine, it would not be able to neutralise India's broader nuclear weapon capability, with or without the *Arihant*. As regards the comparison of combat capabilities of conventional submarines and SSNs/SSBNs, it is well established that the former are not 'inferior' operational combat platforms merely on account of the absence of nuclear propulsion or nuclear weapons. Both these capabilities (though vital strategically) rarely come in handy in a

tactical scenario. Admiral Naqvi again exaggerates his case by suggesting that the Pakistan Navy's conventional submarines would not be able to stand up to India's SSBN.

Interestingly, signs that the PN has been thinking seriously about nuclear submarines have been around for some time now. As early as in 2008, in an interview to a Pakistan daily, the then PN Chief, Admiral Noman Bashir, had said that Pakistan was quite capable of building a nuclear submarine and would do so "if required". Pakistan, he said, is a recognized nuclear power and if the government made a decision, the nation would develop a nuclear weapon. In February 2012, Admiral Asif Sandhila, the present Chief of the PN, stated to the Pakistani media that the PN was mindful of India's plans to complete the sea-based arm of its nuclear triad, and was "taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance" in the Indian Ocean region.

Questions, however, remain on Pakistan's capability to design and develop a sea-based nuclear missile. Even China, which is known to be helping Pakistan in its nuclear capabilities, does not possess a credible submarine-launched missile. The odds that Pakistan will succeed in developing its undersea nuclear ballistic missile without assistance from China are highly unfavourable. Even if it did manage to get an SSBN, it is not certain whether the Pakistan Navy will be in a position to undertake the responsibility of the nation's second-strike capability.

Therefore, the recent drive by PN's senior serving and retired naval officers to persuade the security establishment as well as the man on the street of the necessity of a nuclear submarine capability appears ill-founded, if not disingenuous. Outwardly, it may serve to create a sense of insecurity—vital in persuading politicians about the need for a new capability—but the manifest lack of strategic logic will eventually convince few.

Pakistan's naval leadership will also be aware of the risks and financial costs of developing and operating a nuclear submarine—the need to constantly refine equipment and train personnel; of razor-sharp communications and command and control systems; and the requirement of mastering safety procedures. In the final analysis the SSBN is not an asset if it is not mastered well and operated optimally. Merely possessing one offers no strategic advantages.

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http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/PakistanNavysNuclearAspirations_AbhijitSingh_290612

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